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Research Article
The environment carries sensory signals of high variabil-
ity, both with respect to their physical nature (e.g., pho-
tons for vision, air vibrations for audition, chemical 
substances for taste) and to the way they are processed 
(e.g., transduced by different sensory receptors, pro-
cessed by different brain areas). Despite such variability, 
subjective percepts are not experienced as sums of inde-
pendent features but as integrated multimodal experi-
ences. For example, people experience perceiving a 
black crow squawking rather than seeing a crow and 
hearing a squawk. This phenomenological observation is 
central to most theories of consciousness that postulate 
strong interdependencies between integration and con-
sciousness (e.g., Baars, 2002; Dehaene & Changeux, 
2011; Tononi, 2008, 2011). Arguably, whereas uncon-
scious processing is thought to be encapsulated without 
any exchange of information between different brain 
areas, conscious perception involves long-range and 
feedback projections that enable the integration of differ-
ent types of information across the brain (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011).
When information is spread across sensory modalities, 
its combination into a new, unified representation is 
called multisensory integration. This term refers both to 
combination of information into a perceptual experience 
(e.g., combining the visual properties of a crow with the 
squawking sound it makes) and to combination of infor-
mation into semantic judgments (e.g., detecting the 
incongruity of a meowing crow). Is consciousness neces-
sary for multisensory integration? To claim that it is not, 
one would need to demonstrate that two subliminal (i.e., 
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Abstract
Multisensory integration is thought to require conscious perception. Although previous studies have shown that an 
invisible stimulus could be integrated with an audible one, none have demonstrated integration of two subliminal 
stimuli of different modalities. Here, pairs of identical or different audiovisual target letters (the sound /b/ with the 
written letter “b” or “m,” respectively) were preceded by pairs of masked identical or different audiovisual prime digits 
(the sound /6/ with the written digit “6” or “8,” respectively). In three experiments, awareness of the audiovisual digit 
primes was manipulated, such that participants were either unaware of the visual digit, the auditory digit, or both. 
Priming of the semantic relations between the auditory and visual digits was found in all experiments. Moreover, a 
further experiment showed that unconscious multisensory integration was not obtained when participants did not 
undergo prior conscious training of the task. This suggests that following conscious learning, unconscious processing 
suffices for multisensory integration.
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not consciously perceived) stimuli can nevertheless be 
integrated.
Previous studies of unconscious multisensory integra-
tion have shown that the processing of an invisible stimu-
lus (e.g., under visual masking, binocular rivalry, or 
continuous flash suppression) is influenced by the simul-
taneous presence of an auditory (Alsius & Munhall, 2013; 
Chen & Spence, 2010, 2011; Ngo & Spence, 2010; Palmer 
& Ramsey, 2012), tactile (Lunghi, Binda, & Morrone, 
2010), or proprioceptive (Salomon, Lim, Herbelin, Hessel-
mann, & Blanke, 2013) stimulus that is consciously per-
ceived. Yet because participants in these studies were 
always conscious of one of the two stimuli, it could still 
be argued that it is the conscious perception of that stim-
ulus that allowed for its integration with the subliminal 
one. Thus, none of the previous studies provides evi-
dence for multisensory integration in the complete 
absence of awareness. An exception is a recent study by 
Arzi and colleagues (2012), in which novel associations 
between tones and odors were learned during sleep. 
However, as acknowledged by the authors, controlling 
stimulus awareness during sleep is difficult, and the pos-
sibility remains that the stimuli were consciously accessed 
when presented, but forgotten by the time of awaking.
Here, we measured multisensory integration of two 
subliminal stimuli at the behavioral level. To do so, we 
presented participants with a pair of digits—one audi-
tory, the other visual—and asked them to judge whether 
the two were identical to or different from one another 
(e.g., the sound “eight” and the written digit “8” or “6,” 
respectively). Critically, we tested whether such judgment 
can be formed even when both the written digit and the 
speech sound representing that digit are unconsciously 
presented. For this purpose, we used response priming 
(Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007), so that after the sub-
liminal pair of audiovisual digits, a supraliminal audiovi-
sual pair appeared, this time of spoken and written 
letters, which could again be either identical to or differ-
ent from one another—for example, the sound “b” (/b/) 
and the visual letter “b” or “m,” respectively. First, partici-
pants were asked to indicate whether the auditory letter 
was identical to or different from the visual letter (the 
target task). Then they were asked to determine whether 
the auditory digit was identical to or different from the 
visual digit (the prime task). We reasoned that if the 
audiovisual primes were integrated despite lack of aware-
ness, judgments of the relations between the auditory 
and visual target letters would be influenced by the rela-
tions between the auditory and visual prime digits (i.e., 
congruency priming; see van Opstal, Gevers, Osman, & 
Verguts, 2010, for similar experimental logic).
Accordingly, we expected shorter reaction times when 
judging target letters conveying the same relation as the 
prime (i.e., an identical target pair preceded by an 
identical prime pair, or a different target pair preceded by 
a different prime pair) than when judging target letters 
conveying a different relation than the prime digits (i.e., 
an identical target pair preceded by a different prime 
pair, or a different target pair preceded by an identical 
prime pair).
Note that this task does not probe cross-modal pro-
cessing (e.g., whether participants processed the written 
digit “8” more quickly after hearing the sound “eight” 
than after hearing the sound of a different number). 
Rather, it directly measures the ability to integrate two 
stimuli by judging the relations between them, which 
cannot be subserved by independent unimodal process-
ing of each stimulus separately. Such independent pro-
cesses would not allow for the comparison of the prime 
digits, because such a comparison requires the visual and 
auditory pathways to be functionally connected either 
directly or indirectly through bimodal neurons receiving 
inputs from each sensory modality. Accordingly, we con-
sider congruency priming as evidence for multisensory 
integration.
In the following set of experiments, we sought to 
(a) replicate previous findings showing that a subliminal 
visual stimulus can be integrated with a supraliminal 
auditory stimulus (Experiment 1), (b) explore whether 
such integration can also take place when the auditory 
stimulus is subliminal and the visual stimulus is supra-
liminal (Experiment 2), and—most important—(c) deter-
mine whether integration can occur when both auditory 
and visual stimuli are subliminal (Experiment 3). We fur-
ther tested the role of conscious training in enabling 
unconscious integration (Experiment 4). Taken together, 
these experiments allowed us to directly estimate the role 
of perceptual awareness in multisensory integration.
Method
Participants
In total, 172 healthy volunteers with normal or corrected-
to-normal visual acuity were recruited from the student 
population of the California Institute of Technology (age 
range: 18–34 years). Twenty-six students participated in 
Experiment 1 (13 females, 13 males), 28 in Experiment 2 
(17 females, 11 males), 21 in Experiment 3 (10 females, 
11 males), and 22 in Experiment 4 (12 females, 10 males). 
For Experiments 1 and 2, sample sizes were set to 
include 25 to 30 participants. After analyzing the results 
of these experiments, we estimated the effect sizes and 
accordingly redefined the sample sizes for Experiments 
3 and 4 to include 20 to 25 participants. Seventy-five 
subjects participated in the control experiments (see 
Supplemental Experiments in the Supplemental Material 
available online).
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Participants who could discriminate the relations of 
the prime pairs with an accuracy above 65% in the 
unconscious block were excluded from further analyses 
(9 in Experiment 1, 6 in Experiment 2). This cutoff was 
based on the accuracy distributions obtained in pilot 
experiments and in Experiments 1 and 2, in which most 
accuracy scores were distributed around chance level 
with a certain amount of noise that we estimated to be 
approximately 15% (standard deviation of accuracy was 
13.0% in Experiment 1 and 14.0% in Experiment 2). All 
participants were naive to the purpose of these experi-
ments and gave informed written consent. All experi-
ments conformed to institutional guidelines and to the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and apparatus
Stimuli were presented using MATLAB (The MathWorks, 
Natick, MA) and the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 
1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997). Participants’ heads 
were stabilized using a chin rest located 57 cm away from 
a 19-in. CRT screen (resolution: 1,024 × 768; refresh rate: 
100 Hz).
All primes and all targets were pairs of auditory and 
visual stimuli. Prime pairs were combinations of the writ-
ten and spoken digits “2,” “4,” “6,” and “8.” Target pairs 
were combinations of the written and spoken letters “b,” 
“j,” “k,” and “m” (speech sounds: /b/, /dʒei/, /kei/, and 
/m/, respectively). All visual stimuli were presented in 
Courier font. Prime digits subtended 0.8° × 1.0° of the 
visual field (0.16 Michelson contrast), and target letters 
subtended 0.9° × 1.0° of the visual field (0.33 Michelson 
contrast). The visual mask was the symbol “#” (0.8° × 1.2°; 
0.33 Michelson contrast). All auditory stimuli were mono 
sounds from Internet resources and were played binau-
rally using headphones. They were first resampled at 
48,000 Hz, normalized, and then compressed using 
Audacity software (Version 2.0.5; http://audacity.sourceforge 
.net/) to have a 300-ms duration. Prime digits were played 
at 10% of the maximal intensity allowed by the sound 
card in the conscious condition, and 0.1% of this intensity 
in the unconscious condition (i.e., with a relative decrease 
of 20 dB compared with the conscious condition). The 
target letters were played at 20% of the maximal intensity. 
The auditory mask was a 300-ms noise pattern generated 
by time-domain scrambling (Ellis, 2010) the spoken 
sounds “3,” “5,” “7,” and “9,” played at 20% of the maximal 
intensity allowed by the sound card. An overlap of 80 ms 
was introduced between the masks and the prime and 
between the prime and the target, as pilot experiments 
showed that it substantially improved masking. Our audi-
tory-masking method was validated by the observation 
of an unconscious numerical-distance effect (see 
Experiment 5 in the Supplemental Material).
Procedure
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 included a conscious condition 
that served as a training phase, followed by an uncon-
scious condition that differed only in the presentation of 
the prime pair: In the conscious condition, the digits 
were presented supraliminally, whereas in the uncon-
scious condition, either one or two of the stimuli in the 
prime pair were presented subliminally. Our task fol-
lowed the logic of the congruency-priming paradigm by 
van Opstal and colleagues (2010; Fig. 1). In a nutshell, it 
consisted of manipulating the relations between an audi-
tory and a visual digit (primes) and between an auditory 
and a visual letter (targets): The relations between the 
items in the prime pair could either be similar to those in 
the target pair (items in both pairs are identical or both 
are different) or not similar to those in the target pair 
(items in the prime pair are identical and in the target 
pair are different, or vice versa).
In each trial, the first event was the prime pair. In the 
visual domain, a digit was presented for 30 ms, preceded 
and followed by one mask and one blank screen, each 
lasting 50 ms. In the auditory domain, a 300-ms spoken 
digit was preceded by a 300-ms mask, with an overlap of 
80 ms between them (so that the prime started 220 ms 
after mask onset). Awareness of the visual digit was manip-
ulated by changing the location of the blank screens 
(Dehaene et  al., 2001). In the conscious condition, the 
prime pair was preceded and followed by blank screens 
(so the participants could consciously see the digit). In the 
unconscious condition, on the other hand, the prime pair 
was preceded and followed by masks, which suppressed 
it from awareness. Awareness of the auditory digit was 
manipulated by changing its intensity (see Stimuli and 
Apparatus). The onset of the auditory prime corresponded 
with the onset of the visual sequence (i.e., onset of the 
mask in the conscious condition and onset of the blank in 
the unconscious condition), so that the visual prime was 
presented 50 ms after the onset of the auditory prime.
The second event in each trial was the target pair. In 
the visual domain, a target was presented for 200 ms (this 
relatively short duration maximizes aftereffects; Wolfe, 
1984). In the auditory domain, a spoken letter was played 
simultaneously with a second mask for 300 ms (again 
having an 80-ms overlap with the prime). The auditory 
target letter was presented 10 ms before the onset of the 
visual target letter. Participants were asked to indicate 
first whether the two letters (target pair) were identical to 
each other (right arrow key) or different from one another 
(left arrow key) and then to do the same for the two dig-
its (prime pair). They were instructed to respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible about the targets. 
No time pressure was put on the primes task, which 
served as an objective measure of awareness.
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On each trial, one of four visual primes was combined 
with one of four auditory primes representing the same or 
a different digit. One of four visual targets was combined 
with one of four auditory targets representing the same or 
a different letter. The semantic relations between primes 
was congruent with those between targets in half the tri-
als, and incongruent in the other half. Although congru-
ency was mostly defined at a semantic level (i.e., on the 
basis of the comparison of the audiovisual primes’ numer-
osity), it may also involve the phonetic level (i.e., phone-
mic awareness of “two” after seeing the digit “2” and 
comparison with the actual phoneme conveyed by the 
auditory prime). Trial order was fully randomized, both 
with respect to prime congruency and to its relations with 
the target. The first five trials of each experiment were 
considered training and were not analyzed. In Experiments 
1, 2, and 3, participants first performed a block of 96 con-
scious trials in which both the auditory and the visual 
primes were consciously perceived. This conscious block 
served as training and was followed by a block of 96 par-
tial or fully unconscious trials, in which masking was 
applied to the visual prime only (Experiment 1), the 
auditory prime only (Experiment 2), or both the auditory 
and the visual primes (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, 
participants performed two blocks of 96 fully unconscious 
trials, in which both the auditory and the visual primes 
were masked, with no prior conscious training.
Results
Reaction-time analysis
The average reaction time to the target pairs in the con-
scious and unconscious conditions were 1,412 ms (95% 
confidence interval, or CI = [1,230, 1,594]) and 984 ms 
(95% CI = [782, 1,186]) in Experiment 1, 1,165 ms (95% 
CI = [1,034, 1,296]) and 879 ms (95% CI = [750, 1,008]) in 
Experiment 2, 1,136 ms (95% CI = [983, 1,289]) and 820 
ms (95% CI = [673, 967]) in Experiment 3, and 833 ms 
(95% CI = [653, 1,013]) in the unconscious condition of 
Experiment 4. Trials with a reaction time below 300 ms 
or above 4,000 ms were excluded (3.4% and 1.9% of trials 
in the conscious and unconscious conditions in 
Experiment 1, 0.8% and 1.5% in Experiment 2, and 1.0% 
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Primes Targets
300 ms
300 ms
300 ms
80 ms
80 ms
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Fig. 1. Experimental design and procedure. As shown in (a), stimuli were presented in pairs consisting of a visual item matched with a spoken 
item. In each trial, an audiovisual prime pair was followed by an audiovisual target pair. Items within each prime pair and target pair were either 
semantically different (i.e., the written item did not correspond with the spoken item) or identical (i.e., the written and spoken items corresponded). 
In congruent trials, the items in the prime pair and the items in the target pair shared the same relation; that is, if the primes were identical, then the 
targets were identical, and if the primes were different, then the targets were different. In incongruent trials, the relation between items in the prime 
pair was different from the relation between items in the target pair; that is, if the primes were different, then the targets were the same, as in (b), 
and vice versa. In the example trial sequence shown in (b), streams of visual (top) and auditory (bottom) stimuli were presented simultaneously but 
for differing lengths of time. The middle line represents the visual stream with the same time scale as the auditory stream. Primes were preceded and 
followed either by blank screens (conscious condition) or by masks to suppress the stimulus from awareness (unconscious condition, shown here).
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and 3.0% in Experiment 3, as well as 5.8% for the uncon-
scious condition in Experiment 4).
Only trials in which the semantic relations of the tar-
get pairs were judged correctly were kept for further 
analyses (see Table 1 for accuracies in the conscious 
conditions and Table 2 for accuracies in the uncon-
scious conditions). A logarithmic transformation was 
applied on the remaining reaction times in order to 
reduce deviations from normality that are commonly 
observed on raw reaction times (Whelan, 2010), so that 
the data met the normality assumption underlying anal-
yses of variance (ANOVAs) and t tests. For a better esti-
mation of effect sizes, we report the exponential of the 
effect values after logarithmic transformation (i.e., we 
report effects in milliseconds rather than the logarithmic 
unit). Reaction times in the target task were estimated 
using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with tar-
gets’ semantic relations (identical vs. different) and 
prime-target congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as 
within-subjects factors and participants as the random 
variable. Congruency priming was calculated by sub-
tracting participants’ mean reaction time in congruent 
trials from their reaction time in incongruent trials, dur-
ing the first task (i.e., to determine whether the target 
pair was made of identical or different letters). Thus, 
positive values indicate that reaction times were shorter 
in congruent trials than in incongruent trials. All tests 
were two-tailed. Statistical analyses were performed 
using R (R Development Core Team, 2013).
Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Conscious conditions. The conscious conditions of 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were identical and served as a 
training phase before the unconscious conditions. In all 
three experiments, participants could discriminate both 
the semantic relations of the audiovisual targets (accu-
racy > 88%) and the audiovisual primes (accuracy > 84%; 
Table 1). The ANOVA on reaction times for trials on 
which only correct responses were made in these first 
three experiments revealed a main effect of targets’ 
semantic relations (all ps < .001; Table 3): Responses 
were faster for pairs of identical targets than for pairs of 
different targets (mean difference > 143 ms). In addition, 
main effects of prime-target congruency (all ps < .001; 
Table 3) demonstrated congruency priming: Responses 
were faster in congruent trials (identical prime pair and 
identical target pair, or different prime pair and different 
target pair) than in incongruent trials (identical prime 
pair and different target pair, or vice versa; mean differ-
ence > 269 ms). An interaction between prime-target 
congruency and targets’ semantic relations was found in 
Experiment 2, F(1, 27) = 5.29, p = .03, η2 = .16, and 
Experiment 3, F(1, 20) = 5.70, p = .03, η2 = .22, which 
suggests that congruency priming was bigger for pairs of 
identical targets (e.g., the sound and the written letter 
“b”) than for pairs of different targets (e.g., the sound “b” 
and the written letter “j”) (respective mean differences: 
78 ms and 80 ms). This interaction did not reach signifi-
cance in Experiment 1, F(1, 25) = 2.20, p = .15, η2 = .08.
Unconscious conditions
Prime visibility. In the unconscious conditions, mask-
ing was applied to the visual prime only (Experiment 
1), the auditory prime only (Experiment 2), or both the 
visual and auditory primes (Experiment 3). We found 
that participants could accurately discriminate the simi-
larity of audiovisual target pairs but not of audiovisual 
prime pairs, although the discriminability of prime pairs 
was close to being higher than chance in Experiment 1 
Table 1. Average Percentage of Correct Judgments Identifying 
the Semantic Relations Between Primes and Targets in the 
Conscious Conditions of Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Experiment Primes Targets
Experiment 1 84.4 [80.7, 88.1] 88.1 [84.8, 91.4]
Experiment 2 85.3 [82.2, 88.4] 90.4 [87.5, 93.3]
Experiment 3 80.3 [76.2, 84.4] 88.2 [84.5, 91.9]
Note: Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
Table 2. Average Percentage of Correct Judgments Identifying the Semantic 
Relations Between Primes and Targets in the Unconscious Conditions of 
Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Experiment
Primes Targets
Accuracy t test Accuracy
Experiment 1 53.3 [50.2, 56.4] t(16) = 2.06, p = .06 92.3 [89.8, 94.8]
Experiment 2 51.6 [49.4, 53.8] t(21) = 1.47, p = .16 95.5 [93.3, 97.7]
Experiment 3 47.2 [44.8, 49.6] t(20) = –2.27, p = .035 94.5 [92.1, 96.9]
Experiment 4 50.0 [48.8, 51.2] t(21) = 0.04, p = .97 93.3 [91.3, 95.3]
Note: Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals. For primes, one-sample t tests were 
conducted to determine whether accuracy was better than chance (50%).
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and was significantly lower than chance in Experiment 3 
(Table 2). This was taken as evidence for an absence of 
awareness. Yet one could argue that chance-level perfor-
mance for discriminating audiovisual primes could have 
still been obtained if participants had consciously per-
ceived the masked stimuli yet were unable to judge the 
relations between the auditory and visual digits because 
of memory failure. This alternative explanation stems 
from the fact that the task of assessing the relations of 
the items in the prime pair always came after the task of 
assessing the items in the target pair. Accordingly, there 
was a time lag between the end of the stimuli sequence 
and the primes task. This time lag could have led partici-
pants to forget what the primes were (and therefore per-
form at chance), even if they did manage to consciously 
perceive them.
To exclude this possibility, we conducted three addi-
tional control experiments, in which there was no task 
involving the target pairs. Instead, participants were 
instructed to judge the relations between the visual and 
auditory digit primes immediately after the stimuli 
sequence and ignore the targets completely. Note that 
this instruction, together with the absence of any task 
involving the target, could have motivated participants to 
allocate more attentional resources to the prime pair, 
thereby enhancing its chances of being consciously per-
ceived (Lavie, 2006). Yet even under these stringent con-
ditions, participants’ performance was still at chance 
when judging the semantic relations between the audi-
tory and visual digits (see Supplemental Experiments 
6–8).
In addition, because the objective measure we used 
specifically probed the capacity to judge the relations 
between the auditory and visual primes, participants 
could have still performed at chance even if they had 
perceived one of the stimuli consciously. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, it could be argued that participants had 
partial access to either the auditory or the visual prime 
(in Experiments 1 and 2, this was always the case, 
because only one sensory modality was masked). 
However, this concern is mitigated by participants’ 
reports after the experiment that they did not perceive 
any of the digits. More important, the fact that chance-
level performance was found in the first two experiments 
confirms that each modality was indeed effectively 
masked. Thus, it seems less plausible that one of the two 
primes was consciously perceived in Experiment 3.
Reaction times. In our analysis of reaction times, we 
found that as in the conscious conditions, there was a 
main effect of targets’ semantic relations (all ps < .003); 
that is, responses were faster for pairs of identical tar-
gets than for pairs of different targets (mean difference > 
60 ms; see Table 4). Although we found no main effect 
of prime-target congruency in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 
(ps = .54, .33, and .40, respectively), interactions between 
targets’ semantic relations and prime-target congruency 
were found in all three experiments (ps = .02, .02, and 
.03, respectively). In Experiments 1 and 3, this interaction 
stemmed from congruency priming for identical but not 
for different targets, whereas in Experiment 2 it reflected 
the opposite situation of congruency priming in different 
but not identical targets (Fig. 2, Table 4).
To account for the possibility that the residual visibility 
of the prime could have driven congruency priming, we 
relied on Greenwald’s regression method (Greenwald, 
Klinger, & Schuh, 1995) and conducted a linear regres-
sion at the group level between the amplitude of congru-
ency priming and the accuracy in the objective measure 
of awareness (primes task). It revealed no relations 
between priming and awareness (Experiment 1: adjusted 
R2 = −.03, p = .48; Experiment 2: adjusted R2 = −.04, p = 
.75; Experiment 3: adjusted R2 = −.03, p = .48). Finally, to 
detect potential differences of reaction times in the 
primes task, we ran a 2 × 2 repeated measure ANOVA 
with relation and primes congruency as within-subjects 
Table 3. Main Effects of Targets’ Semantic Relations and Congruency Priming in the Conscious Conditions of Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3
Experiment
Effect of targets’ semantic relations
Congruency priming for identical 
targets
Congruency priming for different 
targets
M F test M t test M t test
Experiment 1 224 [134, 314] F(1, 25) = 26.16,
p < .001, η² = .51
390 [247, 533] t(25) = 5.21,
p < .001
337 [204, 470] t(25) = 5.25,
p < .001
Experiment 2 146 [87, 205] F(1, 27) = 36.10,
p < .001, η² = .51
304 [198, 410] t(27) = 6.11,
p < .001
225 [156, 294] t(27) = 7.09,
p < .001
Experiment 3 143 [67, 219] F(1, 20) = 15.49,
p < .001, η² = .44
312 [202, 422] t(20) = 6.68,
p < .001
232 [156, 308] t(20) = 6.30,
p < .001
Note: Main effects of targets’ semantic relations were calculated by taking the mean reaction-time difference (in ms) between different and 
identical targets. Congruency-priming scores were calculated by subtracting participants’ mean reaction time in congruent trials from their mean 
reaction time in incongruent trials during the target task. Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
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factors. No effect reached significance in the unconscious 
conditions of Experiments 1 through 3 (all ps > .2). As 
this effect is commonly found in the field of unconscious 
cognition, we should note that congruency effects were 
found only for reaction times (and not for response 
biases or accuracies), probably because unconscious 
stimuli have a weak impact on overt responses (see 
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007, for a review).
Taken together, our results show that multisensory 
integration can take place when participants are unaware 
of one, and even both, of the integrated stimuli. Even 
though the unconscious priming effects we found were 
Table 4. Main Effects of Targets’ Semantic Relations and Congruency Priming in the Unconscious Conditions of Experiments 1, 2, 
3, and 4
Experiment
Effect of targets’ semantic relations
Congruency priming for identical 
targets
Congruency priming for different 
targets
M F test M t test M t test
Experiment 1 89 [42, 136] F(1, 16) = 20.49,
p < .001, η² = .56
47 [4, 90] t(16) = 2.18,
p = .04
–17 [–68, 34] t(16) = 0.92,
p = .37
Experiment 2 61 [14, 108] F(1, 21) = 11.54,
p = .003, η² = .35
–11 [–35, 13] t(21) = 1.10,
p = .28
37 [2, 72] t(21) = 2.25,
p = .035
Experiment 3 95 [40, 150] F(1, 20) = 14.82,
p = .001, η² = .43
59 [0, 118] t(20) = 2.18,
p = .04
–32 [–75, 11] t(20) = 1.17,
p = .26
Experiment 4 79 [42, 116] F(1, 20) = 26.38,
p = .001, η² = .56
25 [–17, 67] t(21) = 0.84,
p = .41
4 [–22, 30] t(21) = 0.05,
p = .96
Note: Main effects of targets’ semantic relations were calculated by taking the mean reaction-time difference (in ms) between different and 
identical targets. Congruency-priming scores were calculated by subtracting participants’ mean reaction time in congruent trials from their mean 
reaction time in incongruent trials during the target task. Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals.
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relatively large (around 50 ms, corresponding to ~5% of 
the total reaction time), their amplitude was nevertheless 
much lower compared with the conscious effects (around 
300 ms, corresponding to ~25% of the total reaction time). 
Such smaller effect sizes are typical of unconscious pro-
cesses, both with respect to perceptual aftereffects and 
higher-level cognitive functions (e.g., Blake, Tadin, Sobel, 
Raissian, & Chong, 2006). Here, we are facing the conun-
drum of whether conscious access has a causal role in the 
decrease of priming or whether this decrease is simply 
due to the reduced stimulus strength imposed by mask-
ing. The latter hypothesis is challenged by the fact that 
masking did not affect multisensory integration in an 
additive manner: The amplitude of priming was not 
smaller when masking was applied to both the auditory 
and visual primes, compared with when it was applied to 
either the auditory or the visual prime separately (Table 4).
An aspect of our results that remains unclear is why 
unconscious congruency priming was found for identical 
targets in Experiments 1 and 3, and for different targets in 
Experiment 2, in which masking was applied to the audi-
tory prime. In a control experiment, we ruled out the 
possibility that this may stem from a failure in uncon-
scious auditory processing (see Supplemental Experiment 
5 for auditory semantic priming). Several differences 
between Experiment 2 and Experiments 1 and 3 could 
possibly account for this pattern of results. First, 
Experiment 2 was the only experiment in which the 
visual prime was consciously perceived (in Experiment 1, 
the auditory prime was consciously perceived, and in 
Experiment 3, both primes were suppressed from aware-
ness). This could have led to differential processing of 
semantic relations, in line with the modality-appropriate-
ness framework (Welch & Warren, 1980), according to 
which multisensory integration varies as a function of the 
perceptual strength of the relevant stimuli.
Second, in Experiment 2, there was a decrease of 
sound intensity between the conscious and unconscious 
conditions (i.e., a 20-dB change). Such a change in stim-
ulus energy was previously found to invert semantic 
priming (Wentura & Frings, 2005). In addition to stimu-
lus energy, the difference in duration between the audi-
tory and visual components of the prime pairs also might 
have led to this difference between experiments: 
Although the visual digits were presented for 50 ms, the 
auditory ones lasted 300 ms. Previous studies have 
shown that in the visual domain, prime duration can 
invert the direction of priming effects (Barbot & Kouider, 
2012; Faivre & Kouider, 2011). Accordingly, this might 
have given rise to the pattern of results observed here. 
Finally, the priming effect we found in Experiment 2 may 
have partly been driven by the repetition of the target’s 
congruency across trials, as priming was marginally 
larger in trials in which two or more congruent or 
incongruent targets were subsequently presented than in 
trials in which target congruency alternated (p = .05). No 
such carryover effects from one trial to another were 
found in the other experiments (all ps > .19). Future 
studies may be able to shed more light on the different 
mechanisms that come into play during multisensory 
integration of a supraliminal stimulus with a subliminal 
one, and of two subliminal stimuli.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 examined the role of conscious training in 
enabling unconscious multisensory integration. To do 
this, we masked both the visual and the auditory primes, 
and no conscious training was performed. Instead, par-
ticipants performed two blocks of 96 unconscious trials, 
which means they never consciously saw or heard the 
prime pairs.
As in Experiments 1, 2, and 3, participants could accu-
rately discriminate the semantic relations of the audiovi-
sual targets but not of the audiovisual primes (Table 2). 
We found a main effect of targets’ semantic relations, 
with faster responses for identical than for different tar-
gets (Table 4). However, we did not find a main effect of 
prime-target congruency, F(1, 21) = 0.47, p = .50, η2 = .02, 
nor an interaction between the two regressors, F(1, 21) = 
0.56, p = .46, η2 = .03. To further assess whether the lack 
of priming stemmed from insufficient sensitivity of our 
experimental design or from a genuine lack of effect, we 
computed Bayes factors (referred to as B hereafter; see 
Jeffreys, 1961; Dienes, 2011; 0.33 < B < 3 suggests insen-
sitivity, and B < 0.33 implies no effect). The priming 
effects were modeled as uniformly distributed between 0 
ms and 59 ms (i.e., the biggest unconscious priming 
effect found across all experiments). We found that B was 
equal to 0.21 for identical targets and 0.23 for different 
targets, which provides substantial evidence for the null 
hypothesis. The lack of any congruency effect suggests 
that in Experiment 4, no multisensory integration of the 
prime pairs took place. Notably, unconscious training 
was not sufficient to enable multisensory integration, as 
no difference in priming was found between the first and 
second part of the experiment (p > .3). Similar results 
were found when comparing the first with the second 
half of trials in the unconscious conditions in Experiments 
1, 2, and 3 (all ps > .19). This suggests that conscious 
training is needed for subsequently integrating the sub-
liminal prime pairs, possibly by enabling task-related 
strategies (though here, direct stimulus-response map-
ping is unlikely considering the large number of possible 
combinations in our experimental design). Finally, a 2 × 
2 repeated measures ANOVA with relation and prime 
congruency as within-subjects factors revealed no differ-
ence of reaction times in the primes task (p > .2).
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Discussion
In a series of four experiments, we investigated the role 
of consciousness in multisensory integration by system-
atically manipulating the conscious accessibility of audio-
visual stimuli with masking. The results of Experiment 1 
confirmed that an invisible visual stimulus can be inte-
grated with a consciously perceived stimulus (here, in 
the auditory domain), in line with previous studies (see 
Alsius & Munhall, 2013; Chen & Spence, 2010, 2011; Ngo 
& Spence, 2010; Palmer & Ramsey, 2012, for similar con-
clusions with different experimental setups). The results 
of Experiment 2 then showed that such integration can 
take place also for a subliminal auditory stimulus and 
a  consciously perceived visual one. Most crucially, 
Experiment 3 revealed that multisensory integration can 
occur even when both stimuli are subliminally presented 
using masking. This is, to our knowledge, the first dem-
onstration of multisensory integration in complete 
unawareness, with strict measures of stimulus discrim-
inability in awake participants (see Arzi et al., 2012, for 
multisensory integration during sleep).
Our findings are of special interest when considering 
the central role commonly assigned to consciousness in 
information integration (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; 
Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch, 2014; Tononi, 2008, 2011). Some 
researchers (e.g., Baars, 2002) have even specifically pos-
tulated that consciousness is necessary for multisensory 
integration, claiming that global broadcasting of informa-
tion during conscious access is required for the integra-
tion of incoming signals from different sensory modalities. 
Yet others have claimed that multisensory integration can 
take place even without such global access. Two possible 
mechanisms can underlie such unconscious integration. 
According to the global-neuronal-workspace theory 
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001), multisensory integration can be performed by 
multimodal encapsulated neurons that are not connected 
to the global workspace (Dehaene, 2014). Such neurons 
have been described at relatively low-level structures in 
the brain, including subcortical regions like the superior 
colliculus (see Meredith & Stein, 1986; Stein & Stanford, 
2008, for a review).
Other researchers have claimed that multisensory inte-
gration can occur shortly after stimulus onset via feed-
forward connections between sensory cortical areas 
(Schroeder & Foxe, 2005); such rapid, early integration 
arguably takes place unconsciously. In the context of the 
present study, then, we can conjecture that visual and 
auditory primes were first processed in their correspond-
ing sensory cortices, the congruency between the audi-
tory and the visual digits being subsequently discriminated 
either through connections to a bimodal area involved in 
the processing of numeracy (e.g., intraparietal sulcus; see 
Piazza & Izard, 2009) or through direct communications 
between the visual and auditory cortices.
Our results shed new light on the enabling role of con-
sciousness in multisensory integration. We found that par-
ticipants were able to integrate the subliminal visual and 
auditory stimuli when they had previously performed the 
task consciously (Experiment 3) but not when they had 
previously performed the task unconsciously (Experiment 
4). This suggests that conscious but not unconscious train-
ing enabled multisensory integration. Plus, we found that 
effect sizes between the conscious and unconscious con-
ditions differed greatly. Considering these three points, we 
suggest two nonmutually exclusive mechanisms explain-
ing the facilitating effect of consciousness during multisen-
sory integration. One is that the conscious processing of 
audiovisual pairs in the conscious condition facilitated the 
independent, unisensory processing of both the auditory 
and the visual digits—but not necessarily their integration. 
Applied to our study, this would entail that following con-
scious training, the unconscious processing of each com-
ponent of the prime pair is improved, which subsequently 
facilitates their unconscious integration. In the absence of 
conscious training, on the other hand, the unconscious 
processing of each component is weak, leading to the fail-
ure (or even absence) of unconscious integration. In line 
with this interpretation, multisensory experiences are 
known to induce long-lasting facilitatory effects on subse-
quent unisensory processes (e.g., see Thelen & Murray, 
2013, for a review). This mechanism would be supported 
by experiments showing that conscious training increases 
the magnitude of unisensory priming effects (e.g., seman-
tic priming within a sensory modality) beyond that of mul-
tisensory ones (e.g., audiovisual congruency priming).
Another possibility is that conscious training facilitates 
integrative processes themselves, and not only the unisen-
sory processing of the integrated components. In other 
words, conscious exposure to the stimuli and context of 
the task enables the mechanisms by which audiovisual 
digits are compared. Only after these mechanisms have 
been consciously laid down can they be activated auto-
matically, in the absence of awareness. This interpretation 
is supported by the view that consciousness is needed for 
establishing novel strategies and adapting to new stimuli 
sets and tasks (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) and that mul-
tisensory integration is highly adaptive to contextual fac-
tors (van Atteveldt, Murray, Thut, & Schroeder, 2014). Our 
results do not allow us to conclude which of these two 
interpretations is more accurate, hereby calling for further 
research. For instance, evidence for unconscious multi-
sensory integration following conscious training on 
another set of audiovisual primes (e.g., using the odd dig-
its “1,” “3,” “7,” “9” in the training and the even ones “2,” 
“4,” “6,” “8” in the experimental phase) would support the 
latter interpretation and render the former less likely.
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Conclusions
Our findings reveal that the relations between conscious 
and unconscious integrative processes are more complex 
than sometimes assumed (Mudrik et al., 2014). Typically, 
the role of consciousness in cognitive functions is 
described in an all-or-none manner: Either it is necessary 
for a process or not, without comparing performances 
during conscious and unconscious processing. Here, we 
suggest that consciousness may serve as an enabling fac-
tor, allowing for the establishment of novel networks that 
are subsequently used during unconscious multisensory 
integration (Crick & Koch, 2003; Dehaene & Naccache, 
2001). Further studies are needed in order to generalize 
this hypothesis, possibly by manipulating the number, 
novelty, and temporal dynamics of multimodal stimuli, 
their complexity and ecological value, and the level of 
stimulus-response mapping. Only then will researchers 
be able to provide a comprehensive account of the role 
of consciousness in integrative processes.
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